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IDENTITY CRISIS: THE MISCLASSIFICATION 
OF CALIFORNIA UBER DRIVERS 
Benjamin Powell 
 
          The Uber ridesharing service is synonymous with the rise of mobile 
application-based services. This business model has spurred a number 
of novel legal questions, particularly surrounding the proper 
identification of Uber drivers. Are they employees, guaranteed the ample 
protections and workers' rights under California law? Or independent 
contractors, less subject to employer control, but without the same 
protections the State provides to employees? With the proliferation of 
these types of services, answering this question is of critical importance, 
both to current Uber drivers as well as the countless others who will enter 
this rapidly-developing field in the coming years. This Article provides 
an answer to that question by applying longstanding California 
employment law to the Uber model with the aim of properly and 
accurately characterizing its drivers as legally-recognized employees.  
 
  J.D., 2016, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. A special thanks to Samuel Donohue for 
ensuring that this article reached publication, and to Dean Michael Waterstone for guidance as my 
Professor Sponsor. A final thank you to Ariana and Nala for ensuring I had the support system 
necessary to bring this idea to fruition. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
San Francisco-based Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”) has 
become synonymous with the ridesharing phenomenon that has swept 
the globe in recent years. Uber has turned the taxi industry on its head, 
and catalyzed the growth of an entirely new subset of the technology 
industry by pioneering the idea of using a mobile application to 
“broker” services between consumers and providers. 
Uber operates by providing a digital platform that connects 
passengers with independent drivers in real-time through an 
application accessed from a mobile device.1 The application allows a 
potential passenger to view a car’s location, the driver’s photograph, 
and customer ratings before choosing whether to accept a driver’s 
offer for a ride.2 Passengers pay for the service and receive receipts 
through interfacing with Uber’s mobile application.3 
The “independent contractor” is instrumental to Uber’s business 
model. By classifying its drivers as independent business entities, and 
not treating them as “employees,” Uber is exempted from providing 
them with certain benefits afforded to workers classified as 
“employees,” including minimum wage and overtime.4 The practice 
of classifying workers as independent contractors is common, and has 
led to accusations that some businesses purposely misclassify their 
employees as independent contractors in order to avoid the costs 
associated with maintaining an employer-employee relationship.5 
 
 1. Catherine Lee Rassman, STAFF ARTICLE SERIES: Regulating Rideshare Without Stifling 
Innovation: Examining the Drivers, the Insurance “Gap,” and Why Pennsylvania Should Get on 
Board, 15 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 81, 83 (2014). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Independent contractor versus employee, ST. OF CAL. DEP’T OF INDUS. REL., 
http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/faq_independentcontractor.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2015). The list of 
employer benefits is extensive: “Employers using independent contractors also do not have to pay 
payroll taxes, comply with other wage and hour law requirements such as providing meal periods 
and rest breaks, or reimburse their workers for business expenses incurred in performing their jobs. 
Additionally, employers do not have to cover independent contractors under workers’ 
compensation insurance, and are not liable for payments under unemployment insurance, disability 
insurance, or social security.” Id. 
 5. See Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When it Sees One and 
How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 337 (2001) (“The costs of 
payroll taxes, the administrative costs and liabilities of wage and benefits laws, the risks of 
employment discrimination law, the obligation to bargain with unions, the burden of providing 
family or medical leave, and the general uncertainty that many employers feel with respect to the 
law, are reason enough for many employers to consider loosening a few strings in order to convert 
employees to independent contractor status.”). 
50.3 POWELL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2018  4:16 PM 
462 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:459 
Opponents of Uber’s business model argue that companies like 
Uber (and rival Lyft) are essentially providing “passenger for hire” 
services, and thus, should be subjected to the same regulations that 
more traditional providers (e.g., taxi companies) are required to 
comply with.6 Uber, on the other hand, contends that its service is 
distinct from traditional “taxi-style” models, and merely provides “a 
digital marketplace that connects voluntary consumers with voluntary 
drivers, who . . . are independent contractors driving their own cars 
and setting their own schedules.”7 
Whether or not Uber is properly classifying its drivers has 
become a contentious point. Several California Uber drivers have 
successfully contested their statuses as independent contractors in 
administrative contexts, in front of both the California Labor 
Commissioner’s Office and the California Employment Development 
Department (“EDD”).8 Additionally, a class composed of all Uber 
drivers who operate in California has filed a federal lawsuit against the 
ride-for-hire company in a case currently being heard in San 
Francisco. 
The parties’ arguments in both of these contexts boil down 
similarly. Drivers claim that their job duties entitle them as a matter of 
law to classification as employees,9 while Uber contends essentially 
that due to the ostensibly hands-off approach it uses to manage its 
drivers, they are classified properly as independent contractors.10 
However the dust settles around this issue, the fate of the 
California Uber driver has significant implications not only for the 
thousands driving for the company in the state and across the nation 
(and, for that matter, around the world), but for any would-be 
 
 6. Rassman, supra note 1, at 83 (“Whereas taxis require a permit, inspection, maintenance, 
insurance, and their drivers screened and trained, critics scoff that rideshare drivers need only a car, 
some gas, a smartphone, and a bank account.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 7. Id. 
 8. See, e.g., Berwick, 80 Cal. Comp. Cases 936 (Cal. Labor Comm’r June 3, 2015) (finding 
that an Uber driver was misclassified as an independent contractor), and Decision, LICHTEN & 
LISS-RIORDAN, P.C. (June 6, 2015), http://uberlawsui t.com/Uber%20Case %20No.%205 
371509.pdf (finding an Uber driver to be an employee for purposes of unemployment benefits). 
 9. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 
(“Plaintiffs claim that they are employees of Uber, as opposed to its independent contractors, and 
thus are eligible for various statutory protections codified in the California Labor Code.”). 
 10. Id. at 1137 (“Uber argues the drivers are not its employees but instead are independent 
contractors, and therefore not entitled to the protection of the California Labor Code as asserted 
herein.”). 
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entrepreneurs seeking to capitalize on the newest tech-based business 
model as well. 
While there is certainly merit on both sides of the debate 
surrounding proper classification of Uber drivers, the extensive body 
of California law that has developed in this realm may provide a 
definitive answer. Based on the applicable rules, tests, and case law 
that have developed in California over the last several generations, 
Uber drivers are most properly classified as employees, entitled to all 
of the attendant benefits associated with such a title. 
Part II of this Article will discuss California law as it has built on 
this subject. Part III applies this law to Uber’s business model and 
explains the conclusion introduced above. Finally, Part IV considers 
the prudential value of classifying Uber drivers as employees and 
attempts to place the decision in context. 
II.  EMPLOYMENT CLASSIFICATION LAW 
Independent contractor law in California has quite an extensive 
history, stretching back at least to the 1940s.11 While there were 
several important cases in the intervening period between then and the 
1980s, the California Supreme Court consolidated this body of law 
and announced the now-current framework for employment 
classification in 1989 with its decision in S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. 
Department of Industrial Relations.12 
A.  The Borello Framework 
Borello is the seminal case for determining employment 
classifications in California.13 There, the court was asked to determine 
whether agricultural laborers engaged to harvest cucumbers under a 
written “sharefarmer” agreement were “independent contractors” 
exempt from workers’ compensation coverage.14 The grower in the 
operation claimed the “sharefarmer” harvesters were independent 
contractors because they “manage[d] their own labor, share[d] the 
profit or loss from the crop, and agree[d] in writing that they [were] 
not employees.”15 
 
 11. See, e.g., Empire Star Mines Co. v. Cal. Emp’t Comm’n, 168 P.2d 686 (Cal. 1946). 
 12. 769 P.2d 399 (1989). 
 13. Lara v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 769, 779 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). 
 14. Borello, 769 P.2d at 400. 
 15. Id. 
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In tackling the question, the Borello court extensively discussed 
the body of cases that make up employment classification law in 
California,16 settling eventually on what is essentially a two-part 
inquiry for determining worker status: (1) the primary “right to 
control” test, and (2) consideration of several secondary factors.17 
First, the court looks at the degree of control the alleged employer 
maintains over the person doing the work.18 The court explained this 
“control of details” test first arose at common law in the context of 
limiting one’s vicarious liability for the misconduct of a person 
rendering services to him.19 The right to control work details was thus 
particularly important because “the extent to which the employer had 
a right to control activities was . . . highly relevant to the question 
whether the employer ought to be legally liable for [the 
misconduct].”20 
The second element rises out of a concern that the right to control 
work details, while being the “most important” or “most significant” 
consideration, is inherently limited in evaluating “the infinite variety 
of service arrangements.”21 The Borello court therefore opted to 
endorse a number of “secondary indicia” of the nature of a service 
relationship in order to aid the inquiry.22 These secondary factors 
include: 
(a) Whether the one performing services is engaged in a 
distinct occupation or business; 
(b) The kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the 
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the 
principal or by a specialist without supervision; 
(c) The skill required in the particular occupation; 
 
 16. See generally Id. at 403–07 (The Borello court considered cases from as early as 1946 in 
order to synthesize what would become Borello’s two-part test, including Empire Star Mines Co. 
v. Cal. Emp’t Comm’n, 168 P.2d 686 (1946), Perguica v. Indus. Acc. Comm’n, 179 P.2d 812 (1947), 
Isenberg v. Cal. Emp. Stabilization. Comm’n, 180 P.2d 11 (1947), Tieberg v. Unemployment Ins. 
Appeals Bd., 471 P.2d 975 (1970), Laeng v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., 494 P.2d 1 (1972), 
Kowalski v. Shell Oil Co., 588 P.2d 811 (1979), and Germann v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 176 
Cal. Rptr. 868 (1981)). 
 17. Borello, 769 P.2d at 403–04. 
 18. Id. at 403. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 404. 
 22. Id. The Borello opinion would seem to indicate that “the right to discharge at will, without 
cause” is also a secondary factor to be considered along with the others, but later cases have more 
often interpreted this factor largely as informing the primary “right to control” analysis instead. 
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(d) Whether the principal or the worker supplies the 
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person 
doing the work; 
(e) The length of time for which the services are to be 
performed; 
(f) The method of payment, whether by the time or by the 
job; 
(g) Whether or not the work is a part of the regular business 
of the principal; and 
(h) Whether or not the parties believe they are creating the 
relationship of employer-employee.23 
Applying this newly expounded framework to the facts at hand, 
the Borello court found the grower’s arguments unpersuasive.24 With 
regard to the “right to control” test, the court held that because Borello, 
the employer, controlled “all meaningful aspects” of the business 
relationship (price, crop cultivation, fertilization and insect 
prevention, payment, and right to deal with buyers), it thereby retained 
all necessary control over the harvest portion of its operations.25 
The court then applied the secondary multi-factor criteria 
described above, finding that a number of the factors were indicative 
of an employment relationship. It focused on the harvesters’ roles as 
“regular and integrated portion[s]” of Borello’s business operation and 
the permanence of the relationship between Borello and the individual 
harvesters.26 It also briefly addressed several of the other factors: 
 
 23. Id. The Borello court also noted a six-factor test developed by other jurisdictions for 
determining independent contractor status, which includes the following factors (some of which 
overlap with those listed above): (1) the “right to control the work”; (2) the alleged employee’s 
opportunity for profit or loss depending on his managerial skill; (3) the alleged employee’s 
investment in equipment or materials required for his task, or his employment of helpers; (4) 
whether the service rendered requires a special skill; (5) the degree of permanence of the working 
relationship, and; (6) whether the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer’s 
business. Id. at 407. In the few cases that actually cite to these factors, their analysis and application 
are largely folded into the inquiry regarding the main secondary factors listed above. See, e.g., 
Gonzales v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 308, 313–14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); see 
also Johnson v. Berkofsky-Barret Prods., 260 Cal. Rptr. 67, 70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). These 
additional factors are rarely given any independent analysis, and, in some instances, are relegated 
to a footnote. See, e.g., Air Couriers Int’l v. Emp’t Dev. Dep’t, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37, 44 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2007). Thus, they are accorded the same treatment here. 
 24. Borello, 769 P.2d at 400–01. 
 25. Id. at 408. 
 26. Id. at 408. 
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[T]he sharefarmers and their families exhibit no 
characteristics which might place them outside [Worker’s 
Compensation coverage]. They engage in no distinct trade or 
calling. They do not hold themselves out in business . . . 
They invest nothing but personal service and hand tools. 
They incur no opportunity for ‘profit’ or ‘loss’; like 
employees hired on a piecework basis, they are simply paid 
by the size and grade of cucumbers they pick.27 
The court, concerned that a finding of independent contractor 
status for the sharefarmers would “suggest a disturbing means of 
avoiding an employer’s obligations under . . . California [law],” held 
that Borello failed to demonstrate that the sharefarmers were 
independent contractors.28 
B.  Borello Applied 
Since Borello, California courts have applied the above 
framework a number of times. These cases refine and clarify the scope 
and application of both the “right to control” test and the secondary 
factors propounded by the California Supreme Court. 
1.  The Right to Control 
In applying the “right to control” test, courts have emphasized 
that the salient inquiry is “whether the hirer ‘retains all necessary 
control’ over its operations.”29 Further, “what matters under the 
common law is not how much control a hirer exercises, but how much 
control the hirer retains the right to exercise.”30 This has resulted in 
findings of employment relationships both when an employer remains 
intricately involved in the details of the work and when the employer 
maintains some distance between himself and his workers. 
In Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp.,31 the Ninth Circuit, applying 
California law, found a group of drivers who worked for a logistics 
corporation were employees because the company retained “absolute 
control over drivers’ rates, payment, routes, schedules, trucks, 
equipment, appearance, decision to hire helpers, choice of helpers, and 
 
 27. Id. at 409. 
 28. Id. at 410. 
 29. See Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 327 P.3d 165, 171 (Cal. 2014). 
 30. Id. at 172 (citing Perguica v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 179 P.2d 812, 813 (Cal. 1947)). 
 31. 754 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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the right to deal with customers.”32 The court held these circumstances 
were more than sufficient to establish that the employer retained all 
“necessary control.”33 
On the other hand, courts have not hesitated to find employment 
relationships even when a putative employer utilizes a more hands-off 
approach. In another case involving drivers, JKH Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Department of Industrial Relations,34 the California Court of Appeal 
found an employer-employee relationship between a courier company 
and its couriers despite both the company’s lack of control over the 
details of the work and its being more concerned with results rather 
than means of accomplishment: “By obtaining the clients in need of 
the service and providing the workers to conduct it, JKH retained all 
necessary control over the operation as a whole.”35 
Similarly, in Yellow Cab Coop. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals 
Board,36 the California Court of Appeal rejected a taxi company’s 
claim that it was only concerned with the result of the work conducted 
by its drivers.37 The court held that “[i]f Yellow [Cab] were only 
contracting for the ‘particular result’ . . . it would be concerned with 
little more than collecting rent and protecting the leased property. 
Instead, it had an obvious interest in the drivers’ performance as 
drivers. To protect that interest, it treated them as employees.”38 
In State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Brown,39 however, the California 
Court of Appeal returned the opposite result, finding a group of truck 
drivers to be properly classified as independent contractors in part 
because the employer’s “participation [was] limited to offering the 
assignments and paying compensation upon proof of delivery.”40 
In addition, courts have placed particular weight on whether an 
alleged employer retains the right to terminate a worker without cause 
as an indicator of the right to control.41 As the California Supreme 
 
 32. Id. at 1103. 
 33. Id. 
 34. 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 563 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 35. Id. at 579. 
 36. 277 Cal. Rptr. 434 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
     37.   See id. at 441. 
 38. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 39. 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
 40. Id. at 105. 
 41. See, e.g., Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 327 P.3d 165, 172 (Cal. 2014) 
(“Whether a right of control exists may be measured by asking whether or not, if instructions were 
given, they would have to be obeyed on pain of at-will discharge for disobedience.”) (internal 
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Court has explained, “the power of the principal to terminate the 
services of the agent gives him the means of controlling the agent’s 
activities.”42 In Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court,43 
the court found employment status for a pizza delivery driver where 
the employer retained the express contractual right to terminate the 
relationship: “Perhaps no single circumstance is more conclusive to 
show the relationship of an employee than the right of the employer to 
end the service whenever he sees fit to do so.”44 
These cases demonstrate an important point: an employment 
relationship can be found regardless of the control actually exercised 
by the employer. As long as he retains the ability to control the details 
of the work, courts remain satisfied that the right to control has been 
established; it is not a requirement that the employer micromanage 
every aspect of the job’s duties. The natural conclusion from this point 
is that the “right to control” test is largely fact-determinative, and its 
result depends on the totality of the circumstances in conjunction with 
the secondary factors.45 
2.  Secondary Indicia 
While it is true that both the “right to control” test and the 
secondary factors are perhaps best understood when taken together, it 
is important to remember the secondary Borello factors are just that:  
secondary. Thus, they should be weighed as such, with a healthy 
deference to the right to control. 
Additionally, as with the “right to control” test, application of the 
secondary factors is fluid and circumstantial. “These factors ‘generally 
. . . cannot be applied mechanically as separate tests; they are 
intertwined, and their weight depends often on particular 
 
quotation marks omitted) (citing Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court, 269 Cal. Rptr. 
647, 653 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). 
 42. Ayala, 327 P.3d at 171 (citing Malloy v. Fong, 232 P.2d 241, 249 (Cal. 1951)). Indeed, 
the significance of the right to terminate without cause far predates Borello; a testament to its 
relative weight in the analysis. 
 43. 269 Cal. Rptr. 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). 
 44. See id. at 653–54 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Yellow Cab Coop. v. 
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 277 Cal. Rptr. 434, 442 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (employment status 
found in part due to the conclusion that “indirect control was effected through . . . the threat of 
termination.”). 
 45. See Ayala, 327 P.3d at 177 (“[T]he significance of any one factor and its role in the overall 
calculus may vary from case to case depending on the nature of the work and the evidence.”). 
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combinations.’”46 Proceeding with the above in mind, the cases 
following Borello elaborate on the meaning and analysis of each of the 
secondary factors. 
a.  Distinct occupation or business 
A worker’s engagement in a distinct occupation or business 
suggests that the worker is an independent contractor.47 Borello itself 
noted that the sharefarmers “engage[d] in no distinct trade or calling” 
and “d[id] not hold themselves out in business.”48 A number of other 
cases have agreed with this sentiment, finding employment status 
when workers were not operating an independent business apart from 
that of the alleged employer. 
In Antelope Valley Press v. Poizner,49 the court found 
employment status for newspaper deliverers where there was no 
evidence that any of them held themselves out as being part of an 
independent delivery service.50 Similarly, in Air Couriers 
International v. Employment Develop Department,51 the Court of 
Appeal upheld a trial court’s determination that a group of couriers, 
working for a courier company, were employees, and not “engaged in 
a separate profession or operating an independent business.”52 
b.  Supervision 
For obvious reasons, this factor is closely tied to the “right to 
control” test, as close supervision is clearly indicative of an 
employer’s ability to control the details of the work. Consequently, 
increased supervision points to classification as an employee.53 What 
the cases make clear, however, is that the existence of a certain amount 
of freedom in a particular position does not necessarily cut in favor of 
an independent contractor classification.54 Rather, to repeat the 
 
 46. Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing S.G. 
Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1989)). 
 47. Harris v. Vector Mktg. Corp., 656 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1138–39 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 48. Borello, 769 P.2d at 409. 
 49. 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 887 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
 50. Id. at 892–93. 
 51. 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
 52. Id. at 47. 
 53. Malloy v. Fong, 232 P.2d 241, 249 (Cal. 1951) (“The existence of the right of control and 
supervision establishes the existence of an agency relationship.”). 
 54. Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 327 P.3d 165, 171 (Cal. 2014) (“[T]he fact 
that a certain amount of freedom of action is inherent in the nature of the work does not change the 
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refrain, what matters is whether the hirer retains “necessary control” 
over the worker’s actions.55 
c.  Required skill 
Where no special skill is required of a worker, that fact supports 
a conclusion that the worker is an independent contractor.56 
Consideration of this factor is also tied to application of both the “right 
to control” test and the “supervision” factor above. Courts have found 
that when a particular job does not require a specialized set of skills, 
in-depth control of work details is not strictly necessary; this apparent 
lack of control, then, does not necessarily favor independent 
contractor status as long as, again, “necessary control” is maintained.57 
Factually, courts have been particularly unsympathetic to the idea that 
any type of courier or delivery position requires an inordinately high 
level of skill, finding employment status for cab drivers,58 newspaper 
deliverers,59 and delivery truck drivers.60 
 
character of the employment where the employer has general supervision and control over it.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 55. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp., 754 F.3d 1093, 1104 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding 
employee status where a company “closely supervised the drivers’ work through various methods,” 
which pointed to them working under the principal’s direction). 
 56. Harris v. Vector Mktg. Corp., 656 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1139 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 57. Air Couriers Int’l v. Emp’t Dev. Dep’t., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37, 46 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“The 
[trial] court noted that the simplicity of the work (take this package from point A to point B) made 
detailed supervision, or control, unnecessary. Instead, [the employer] retained all necessary control 
over the overall delivery operation.”). 
 58. Yellow Cab Coop. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 277 Cal. Rptr. 434, 441 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1991) (“The work did not involve the kind of expertise which requires entrustment to an 
independent professional . . . and the skill required on the job is such that it can be done by 
employees rather than specially skilled independent workmen.”). 
 59. Antelope Valley Press v. Poizner, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 887, 900 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) 
(“Delivering papers requires no particular skill.”). 
 60. See JKH Enters., Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 563, 579 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2006) (“[T]he functions performed by the drivers, pickup and delivery of papers or packages and 
driving in between, did not require a high degree of skill.”); see also Alexander v. FedEx Ground 
Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 995 (9th Cir. 2014) (“FedEx drivers need no experience to get the job 
in the first place and [the] only required skill is the ability to drive.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). But see State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Brown, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 98, 105 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) 
(finding independent contractor status for truck drivers: “[T]ruck driving—while perhaps not a 
skilled craft—requires abilities beyond those possessed by a general laborer (or, indeed, possessors 
of ordinary driver’s licenses), and the manner in which the services are provided require a greater 
exercise of the driver’s discretion . . . .”). 
50.3 POWELL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2018  4:16 PM 
2017] CLASSIFYING UBER DRIVERS 471 
d.  Instrumentalities, tools, and place of work 
When an alleged employer provides the “instrumentalities, tools, 
and place of work” for the worker, courts have been more inclined to 
find employee status.61 Relevantly, in many of the cases involving 
drivers of various types, courts have found employee status despite the 
fact that a driver might provide his own vehicle in order to complete 
the work.62 
e.  Length of time 
Where a worker is employed for a lengthy period of time, the 
relationship with the employer looks more like an employer-employee 
relationship.63 Analysis of this factor generally focuses on two points: 
whether the job is one in which workers generally remain employed 
for extended periods of time,64 and whether at the time the relationship 
is entered into, there is a contemplated end point.65 
f.  Method of payment 
In general, hourly payment formats favor employee status, while 
per-job payment favors independent contractor status.66 However, 
when other evidence leans toward a finding of employee status, courts 
have not allowed a per-job payment system to change the result.67 
 
 61. Alexander, 765 F.3d at 995 (citing Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp., 754 F.3d 1093, 1104 
(9th Cir. 2014) as holding that, where “Affinity supplied the drivers with the major tools of the job 
by encouraging or requiring that the drivers obtain the tools from them through paid leasing 
arrangements, this factor favored employee status.”). 
 62. Air Couriers, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 47 (“[A]ll [the employer] required of a driver was a 
vehicle and automobile insurance; drivers did not make any major investments in equipment or 
materials.”). But see Alexander, 765 F.3d at 995 (finding employment status for FedEx drivers even 
while conceding that the fact that drivers provide their own vehicles and are not required to get 
other equipment from FedEx “slightly favors” independent contractor status). 
 63. Harris v. Vector Mktg. Corp., 656 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1140 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 64. See, e.g., Ruiz, 754 F.3d at 1105 (“[T]here was no end to the service relationship when 
Affinity and the drivers signed their contracts, and drivers often stayed with Affinity for years.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Air Couriers, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 47 (“[M]any of the 
drivers delivered for Sonic for years. At trial, the drivers testified to lengthy tenures with Sonic, 
another factor inconsistent with independent contractor status.”). 
 65. See, e.g., Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2010) (“This was not a 
circumstance where a contractor was hired to perform a specific task for a defined period of time. 
There was no contemplated end to the service relationship at the time that the plaintiff [d]rivers 
began working for [FedEx].”). 
 66. Alexander, 765 F.3d at 996. 
 67. See Ruiz, 754 F.3d at 1105 (holding that even though drivers were paid by the delivery, 
findings that drivers made approximately eight deliveries per day and the amount paid to each 
driver “essentially remained the same” led to the conclusion that the drivers were essentially paid 
by a regular rate of pay); see also Alexander, 765 F.3d at 996 (“Where . . . there is ample 
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g.  Part of the regular business 
When workers are found to be part of the regular business of the 
employer, this factor favors employee status.68 In applying this factor, 
courts have focused largely on the indispensability of the workers to 
the hirer’s business, and have tended to find employee status when a 
worker’s duties are essential to the operation as a whole.69 
Thus, in Ruiz, the Ninth Circuit found employee status for home 
delivery drivers when the “drivers perform[ed] those home delivery 
services that are the core of [the company’s] regular business,” 
because “[w]ithout drivers, [the company] could not be in the home 
delivery business.”70 
h.  Parties’ beliefs 
As with the “method of payment” factor above, the parties’ 
beliefs about whether a worker is an employee or an independent 
contractor are relevant, but will be ignored if their conduct establishes 
otherwise.71 This is true even when (or perhaps especially when) there 
exists a written agreement that the worker will be classified as an 
independent contractor.72 
Armed with the exegesis of law in this area by California courts 
over the last several decades, application of these concepts to Uber 
drivers provides the solution as to their proper classification. 
III.  APPLICATION TO UBER 
While there are obviously novel aspects to Uber’s business model 
that aren’t precisely encapsulated by the law outlined above, the law 
is sufficiently broad for Uber’s core tenets and policies to fall 
sufficiently within its purview. 
 
independent evidence that the employer has the right to control the actual details of the employee’s 
work . . . , the fact that . . . the employee is paid by the job rather than by the hour appears to be of 
minute consequence.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 68. S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 408 (Cal. 1989). 
 69. Air Couriers Int’l. v. Emp’t Dev. Dep’t., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37, 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) 
(finding that where the company set rates, billed customers, and collected payment, drivers’ 
deliveries were “integral,” “essential,” and “part of [the company’s] regular business”). 
 70. Ruiz, 754 F.3d at 1105. 
 71. Id. (“As the California Court of Appeal has noted . . . “the parties’ label is not dispositive 
and will be ignored if their actual conduct establishes a different relationship.”) (citing Estrada v. 
FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, 336 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)). 
 72. Alexander, 765 F.3d at 996 (finding that while the contract at issue identified the driver as 
an independent contractor, “[u]ltimately . . . neither [FedEx]’s nor the drivers’ own perception of 
their relationship . . . is dispositive.”). 
50.3 POWELL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2018  4:16 PM 
2017] CLASSIFYING UBER DRIVERS 473 
A.  Uber’s Right to Control 
As has been made abundantly clear by the case law outlined 
above, the “right to control” aspect of an employment configuration is 
the most important consideration. As the circumstances surrounding 
Uber’s business model and, more specifically, the interactions 
between Uber and its drivers demonstrate, Uber does indeed exercise 
“all necessary control” over its drivers’ activities. 
Beginning with the hiring stage, it would be difficult to argue that 
Uber does not exercise substantial control over the work details of its 
drivers. In order to drive for Uber, applicants must undergo a fairly 
involved application and screening process. This includes being 
required to upload driver’s license and vehicle information, passing a 
background check, attending a traditional interview with an Uber 
employee, and passing a “city knowledge test.”73 Only after an 
applicant completes these steps and signs a contract with Uber 
(discussed below) is he or she able to begin driving for the company. 
Once approved to join Uber’s ranks, a driver is free to perform 
his duties as he wishes—to an extent. On one hand, Uber drivers 
technically have the freedom to sign in to Uber’s mobile application 
as rarely or as often as they like, subject only to minimally restrictive 
contractual provisions.74 Additionally, once a driver picks up a 
passenger, he is free to complete the route in any appropriate manner.75 
However, it should be noted that drivers have no input whatsoever in 
setting fares—Uber does this on a unilateral basis.76 
On the other hand, and on a more practical level, Uber drivers are 
expected to abide by certain regulations and standards during their 
interactions with passengers. For instance, Uber expects that its 
drivers will accept all ride requests it receives,77 despite the language 
included in the contracts drivers are required to sign.78 
Uber also instructs its drivers to comply with numerous other 
detail-oriented requirements. These include “dressing professionally,” 
 
 73. O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 74. Id. at 1149 (“Uber further claims that the right to control element is not met because drivers 
can work as much or as little as they like, as long as they give at least one ride every 180 days (if 
on the uberX platform) or every 30 days (if on the uberBlack platform).”). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1142. 
 77. Id. at 1149. Supplemental literature provided by Uber provides that it expects drivers not 
to reject ride requests, notwithstanding contractual language to the contrary (see below). 
 78. Exhibit 223-15 at 3, O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 
(No. C-13-3826 EMC) (“You shall have no obligation to the Company to accept any request.”). 
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sending passengers text messages when 1–2 minutes from the pickup 
location, tuning the car’s radio to specific stations, opening doors for 
passengers, and ensuring that drivers’ cars are equipped with 
umbrellas in case of rain.79 
Further evidence of Uber’s right to control its drivers’ work 
details comes in the form of its processes for evaluating and measuring 
driver performance. Uber closely monitors various aspects of its 
drivers’ activities, including the rate and frequency at which drivers 
accept, reject, and cancel potential passengers, how consistently 
drivers arrive on time, and the quality of drivers’ vehicles.80 
Uber also utilizes a rating system, whereby passengers have the 
ability to rate their driver’s services (from one to five stars), and 
drivers in turn are able to rate their passengers.81 
Uber then uses these metrics to evaluate its drivers. Based on a 
driver’s performance in these areas, Uber reserves the right to 
deactivate the accounts of (i.e., terminate) drivers who fall below 
certain “quality standards.”82 Specifically, Uber documents suggest 
that the company will “follow up on every quality issue,” and driver 
contracts provide that Uber may terminate any driver whose star rating 
falls below a specified level.83 In order to prevent drivers from falling 
below these levels, Uber periodically sends “suggestions” to at-risk 
drivers about how to improve their ratings, including further 
recommendations on attire, surpassing arrival time expectations, and 
other rather specific suggestions such as providing bottled water for 
passengers.84 
In analyzing the above information in light of California law, it is 
worth reiterating several points. First, and most specifically, these 
aspects of Uber’s business model are particularly relevant in light of 
 
 79. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1149–50. At least in the context of the O’Connor litigation, 
Uber contends that these requirements are merely “suggestions.” Id. at 1150. Uber’s efforts to 
enforce these rules, however (discussed below), indicate otherwise. 
 80. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 4:5–7, O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. CV 
13-3826-EMC). 
 81. Notice of Motion and Motion of Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. for Summary 
Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 4:11–12, O’Connor v. 
Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 13-03826-EMC). 
 82. Id. at 4:13–15. 
 83. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1151. 
 84. Notice of Motion and Motion of Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. for Summary 
Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 4:15–19, O’Connor, 82 
F. Supp. 3d 1133 (No. 13-03826-EMC). 
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the observation in Part II that the right to terminate at will is a weighty 
indicator of employee status.85 Additionally, and more generally, the 
most important considerations here are (1) that there is a critical 
difference between the level of control actually exercised by an 
alleged employer and the level of control an employer retains the right 
to exercise,86 and (2) that in order to satisfy this element of the Borello 
framework, an employer must only exercise “necessary” control over 
its putative employees.87 
Guided by these considerations, and returning to the realities of 
driving for Uber, it is clear that the company does indeed exercise 
considerable control over its drivers; control that, at the very least, 
rises to a level that satisfies threshold requirements of California law. 
Beginning with the right to terminate, this element cuts sharply in 
favor of satisfying the “right to control” test. The evaluation methods 
discussed above result essentially in a de facto “right to terminate,” 
and Uber’s ability to unilaterally suspend or deactivate drivers’ 
accounts, readily apparent from its contracts with drivers and its 
supporting literature, is highly indicative of a more explicit right to 
terminate at will.88 
Setting aside the right to terminate, the remaining factual 
circumstances also indicate substantial control over work details. To 
be sure, Uber drivers do enjoy a level of freedom in their work that is 
arguably uncommon under a traditional employment relationship. 
Based on this alone, Uber has a colorable argument that it is primarily 
interested in the results of the work as opposed to the details of the 
actual transportation process. In reality, however, Uber’s efforts to 
manage many of the details of the job belie such a conclusion. 
Far from remaining disinterested, Uber has its hand in every step 
of the process. It would be disingenuous to suggest that, in a situation 
in which a worker is subject to evaluation and/or discipline for, inter 
alia, failing to heed “suggestions” about what music to listen to or 
about providing bottled water to passengers, Uber is not retaining “all 
necessary control” over its operations. In fact, these examples 
arguably push Uber’s micromanagement beyond the level of 
 
 85. See Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 327 P.3d 165, 172 (Cal. 2014). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 171. 
 88. As has been alluded to, the parties’ beliefs and language contained in contracts are not 
necessarily dispositive, but consideration of surrounding circumstances in conjunction with the 
above evince a compelling case for Uber’s right to terminate. 
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necessary control and into the realm of the unnecessary, further 
highlighting the point that Uber’s interest in work details meets at least 
the required threshold level under California law. 
Comparisons to case law underscore this conclusion. The facts 
surrounding Uber drivers in part echo Borello itself, where the court 
found that the employer’s control over price, crop cultivation, 
fertilization, payment, and right to deal with buyers constituted all 
necessary control over its sharefarmer employees.89 Similarly, Uber 
controls who its drivers are (and what they drive, for that matter),90 
determines the fares charged to passengers, and reserves the right to 
terminate drivers it deems unsatisfactory. In this sense, there can be 
little doubt that Uber controls “all meaningful aspects”91 of the 
relationship it maintains with its drivers. 
Additionally, language from JKH Enterprises, Inc. v. Department 
of Industrial Relations,92 discussed above, is particularly apposite 
here, as Uber maintains “necessary control” “by obtaining the clients 
in need of the service and providing the workers to conduct it.”93 
As mentioned above, Uber contends at least in some contexts that 
its means of control are properly characterized as “suggestions” rather 
than regulations that Uber actually makes an effort to enforce.94 Even 
if this were the case, however, retaining the right to do so firmly 
indicates satisfaction of the “right to control” test. 
With the right to control element strongly favoring an employer-
employee relationship, the inquiry proceeds to Borello’s secondary 
indicia. 
B.  Borello’s Secondary Indicia 
While subordinate to the right to control work details, the 
secondary Borello factors do provide useful metrics for a deeper 
analysis of an alleged employment relationship. In Uber’s case, while 
certain factors do support an independent contractor classification, the 
 
 89. S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 408 (Cal. 1989). 
 90. Exhibit 223-15 at 4, O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 
(No. C-13-3826 EMC) (Uber’s contract with drivers provides, “You agree that you shall maintain 
a vehicle that is a model approved by the Company. Any such vehicle shall be no more than ten 
(10) model years old, and shall be in good operating condition.”). 
 91. Borello, 769 P.2d at 408. 
 92. 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 563 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 93. Id. at 579. 
 94. O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
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preponderance of factors, in conjunction with the “right to control,” 
do not. 
1.  Distinct Occupation or Business 
Because Uber’s business model is entirely dependent on its 
drivers in order to function, it would take a stretch of the imagination 
to argue that drivers engage in an occupation that is distinct from 
Uber’s. Where, as here, “the work performed by the drivers is wholly 
integrated into [the] operation,”95 the businesses are indistinguishable. 
To be sure, it should be acknowledged that some drivers do solicit 
business from other sources and affiliate themselves with 
transportation companies other than Uber,96 which in theory does 
support independent contractor status. However, because the services 
provided by drivers are such a necessary component of Uber’s 
operations, this fact is far more akin to having multiple jobs than it is 
to acting as an independent contractor doing business with multiple 
distinct entities. 
Uber’s argument on this point would likely be to point to its self-
characterization as a “lead generation” platform, as opposed to a 
transportation company, as evidence that its drivers are engaged in a 
wholly distinct business.97 While creative, and theoretically plausible, 
such distinctions disappear upon closer scrutiny of the reality of the 
working relationship between Uber and its drivers. 
This factor therefore weighs in favor of employee status. 
2.  Supervision 
As mentioned above, this factor is intimately related to the “right 
to control” test, and similar factual elements control both inquiries. 
As discussed more extensively above, Uber’s interest in the 
activities of its drivers, including its evaluation metrics and monitoring 
of ride requests and acceptances, can hardly be described as anything 
 
 95. Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 995 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 96. Notice of Motion and Motion of Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. for Summary 
Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 23:27–28, 24:1–2, 
O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 13-03826-EMC). 
 97. Exhibit 223-15 at 3, O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 
(No. C-13-3826 EMC) (“Raiser (an Uber affiliate) is engaged in the business of providing lead 
generation to the Transportation Provider comprised of requests for transportation service made by 
individuals using Uber Technologies, Inc.’s mobile application.”). 
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other than “supervisory,” notwithstanding the fact that drivers’ duties 
do afford an inherent amount of freedom in their execution. 
Thus, while there are points to be made on either side regarding 
this factor, it more strongly favors an employment relationship when 
considered in light of the “right to control” test.98 
3.  Required Skill 
As foreshadowed in Part II, comparisons to case law suggest an 
obvious conclusion regarding this factor. As far as the skill required 
to drive for Uber is concerned, there is little distinguishing it from any 
of the other driving-related positions mentioned in previous cases, 
which have overwhelmingly found that these jobs do not require a 
high degree of skill. Indeed, some of the positions in those cases, 
namely newspaper deliverers and delivery truck drivers, arguably 
require more skills than those required to drive for Uber, and yet 
employment relationships were found in all instances.99 
It may be true that some drivers fare better than others based on 
their abilities to maximize their ratings, but such accolades are merely 
a result of Uber’s imposition of its own quality control system, rather 
than any objective measure, and the fact nevertheless remains that the 
only skills truly required to drive for Uber are the same skills required 
to drive in California at all—a driver’s license and automobile 
insurance.100 
Therefore, the lack of particularized skill required of Uber drivers 
weighs in favor of employee status. 
4.  Instrumentalities, Tools, and Place of Work 
One of Uber’s strongest arguments lies under this factor, as there 
is no denying the fact that drivers do indeed provide the necessary 
 
 98. Recall the California Supreme Court’s discussion in Ayala v. Antelope Valley 
Newspapers, Inc., 327 P.3d 165, 171 (Cal. 2014), of the non-dispositive nature of a position’s 
intrinsic freedom. 
 99. See Yellow Cab Coop. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 277 Cal. Rptr. 434 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1991) (taxi driver), Antelope Valley Press v. Poizner, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 887 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) 
(newspaper deliverer), and JKH Enters., Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 563 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (delivery truck driver). 
 100. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 23:8–9, O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. CV 
13-3826-EMC). These circumstances also certainly fall short of providing any “true entrepreneurial 
opportunity depending on how well the independents perform their transportation services.” State 
Comp. Ins. Fund v. Brown, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 98, 105 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
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equipment in the form of their own vehicles.101 That said, these 
circumstances are not substantially different from cases like Air 
Couriers,102 discussed above, where, apart from supplying a vehicle, 
drivers made no “major investments in equipment or materials.”103 
Alternatively, it is worth considering that the Uber application 
itself, which is obviously provided by Uber, might constitute a 
significant portion of the “instrumentalities” required by the job. 
Through this lens, Uber arguably does provide the instrumentalities 
needed by drivers to execute their duties, which leans heavily toward 
an employment relationship. All things considered, this factor is 
difficult to analyze, as there is little guidance in the annals of 
California law as to the proper application of this factor to such a novel 
business configuration. 
In either case, because drivers do provide their own vehicles, 
which accounts for at least all of the physical machinery required for 
the position, this factor, on balance, weighs in favor of independent 
contractor status. 
5.  Length of Time 
This factor strongly favors employee status. Contracts entered 
into between drivers and Uber do not contemplate an automatic end 
point. Driver contracts provide that they can be terminated by several 
means—including material breaches, mutual consent, and extended 
inactivity—but do not contain any language indicating a point at 
which the agreement will simply cease to be operative, whether due to 
a lapse of time or completion of a specific task, as one might expect 
from a traditional independent contractor relationship.104 
The working relationship between Uber and its drivers also bears 
little resemblance, if any, to the more familiar independent contractor 
relationship wherein a contractor is hired to perform a specific task for 
 
 101. Technically, Uber drivers are provided an illuminated magnet to affix to their vehicles as 
a signal to passengers. Such “equipment,” however, is more related to branding and perhaps safety 
than anything else, and should not count against Uber in analysis of this factor. Notice of Motion 
and Motion of Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. for Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Support Thereof at 25:13–15, O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (No. 13-03826-
EMC). 
 102. 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
 103. Id. at 47. 
 104. Exhibit 223-15 at 10, O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 
(No. C-13-3826 EMC). 
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a specified amount of time.105 For these reasons, the “length of time” 
factor leans heavily toward an employer-employee relationship. 
6.  Method of Payment 
Analysis in this area presents another example of a factor that cuts 
in favor of independent contractor status, but may prove to be 
inconsequential in the grand scheme. Rather than being paid by the 
hour, Uber drivers are generally paid per trip.106 Thus, while this factor 
is indicative of independent contractor status, it should be reiterated 
that based on case law, such a conclusion is not enough to overcome 
independent evidence that an employer maintains the right to control 
work details.107 
7.  Part of the Regular Business 
This factor largely overlaps with the first secondary factor 
(distinct occupation or business). Accordingly, it weighs heavily in 
favor of employee status as well, considering that based on the points 
discussed above, Uber’s drivers are literally indispensable to its 
operations, and must certainly account for, at minimum, a part of 
Uber’s “regular business.” 
In this regard, the circumstances here once again bear 
resemblance to those in Air Couriers, as Uber also sets rates for rides, 
bills passengers, and collects payment.108 As was the case in Air 
Couriers, the drivers’ activities here are “integral,” “essential,” and 
“part of [Uber’s] regular business.”109 
8.  Parties’ Beliefs 
Case law has shown this factor to be arguably the least probative 
of Borello’s secondary indicia.110 Because courts tend to ignore this 
 
 105. See Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 106. Interestingly, there is some indication that despite paying drivers by the trip, Uber 
advertises possible hourly rates as a means of attracting new applicants. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to 
Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 23:17–19, O’Connor v. 
Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. CV 13-3826-EMC) (“Uber frequently 
advertises or guarantees hourly rates to its drivers.”). 
 107. See Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 996 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 108. Air Couriers Int’l v. Emp’t Dev. Dep’t., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37, 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp., 754 F.3d 1093, 1104 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussed above 
in Part II), and Alexander, 765 F.3d at 996. 
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factor if conduct establishes a different outcome than the one 
contemplated by the parties, its analytical value is limited. 
For the sake of being thorough, however, it should be noted that 
this factor does support an independent contractor relationship. The 
contracts signed by drivers explicitly state: “You represent that you 
are an independent contractor engaged in the independent business of 
providing the transportation services described in this 
agreement . . . .”111 Under a heading entitled “Relationship of Parties,” 
the contract adds, “[t]he Parties intend this Agreement to create the 
relationship of principal and independent contractor and not that of 
employer and employee. The Parties are not employees, agents, joint 
venturers or partners of each other for any purpose.”112 
The contracts between Uber and its drivers thus contain multiple 
instances of language professing the drivers’ statuses to be that of 
independent contractors, which makes it fair to assume that, at least at 
the outset, the parties all believed as such. Therefore, this factor leans 
toward an independent contractor relationship. 
Consideration of Borello’s secondary indicia reveals that with the 
exception of three liberally-construed factors (instrumentalities, 
method of payment, and the parties’ beliefs), the analysis comes down 
strongly in favor of employee status for Uber drivers, and does little 
to alter the similar conclusion reached as a result of the “right to 
control” test. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Upon thorough evaluation of both the “right to control” element 
and the secondary indicia of Borello’s framework, it is clear that in the 
eyes of California law, Uber drivers are employees, not independent 
contractors. It is true that several of the secondary Borello factors 
indicate an independent contractor relationship, but the primary “right 
to control” test simply returns a result that is too conclusively in favor 
of employee status to overturn. Consequently, a court hearing this 
evidence is likely to give credit to these factors supporting Uber’s 
independent contractor model, but is unlikely to be able to look past 
the glaring conclusion reached through the primary portion of the 
 
 111. Exhibit 223-15 at 3, O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (No. C-13-3826 EMC). 
 112. Id. at 9. 
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test—that Uber just retains too much control over its drivers in order 
to properly classify them as independent contractors. 
This is not to say that Uber’s business model is inherently 
unworkable; rather, it is more a matter of Uber needing to manage its 
expectations. If Uber wishes to reap the benefits that accompany 
classification of its drivers as independent contractors, it should alter 
its practices and exercise less control over its employees. In short, 
Uber needs to—essentially—treat its drivers like independent 
contractors. 
In practice, this may prove difficult to accomplish. If, for 
example, Uber began by dispensing with its passenger-driver rating 
system, thereby lessening its hold over the right to terminate its 
drivers, it is difficult to predict what would occur as a result. The status 
of drivers would begin to look more like that of independent 
contractors, but without a rating system, quality might begin to suffer. 
If ensuring high quality, passenger-reviewed customer service was a 
primary consideration of Uber’s as it contemplated how it would 
establish its business (and there is no reason to believe that it was not), 
then altering such fundamental aspects of its company may force Uber 
to confront these types of uncomfortable realities. 
Regardless of these potentially prohibitive consequences, Uber’s 
responsibility, if it wishes to run a business, is to do so in compliance 
with established labor law in California; if doing so would indeed 
prove prohibitive for Uber, perhaps this is an indication that its success 
in revolutionizing the transportation industry, at least under its current 
practices, may have merely been a flash in the pan, and that further 
industry innovation is required before a permanent shift is able to 
occur. 
This conclusion should also serve as a useful signpost for new 
businesses looking to Uber as a blueprint for their own ventures. 
Uber’s business model is that of employer-employee, and emerging 
entrepreneurs should not see its success thus far as an invitation to 
haphazardly classify employees as independent contractors as a means 
of improving their bottom line or making an unprofitable business plan 
profitable. In fact, based on the analysis conducted here, Uber is likely 
to see a successful challenge waged against its own design. 
Accordingly, newcomers to the field should heed this warning and 
take pains to ensure that they do not suffer Uber’s anticipated fate as 
well. 
